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Participation Financing as a Solution to the Agency 
Problem of Perk Consumption in Small Firms
Hua Yu
Although it has been suggested that participation financing may allow publicly- 
traded firms to reduce the agency cost of perk consumption, the effect of this 
type of financing in small firms needs more discussion. The objective of the article 
is to analyze the small firm effects on the effectiveness of the participation 
financing in dealing with the agency problem of perk consumption. The partici­
pation option gives outside investors less protection against the excessive entre­
preneur perk consumption when the firm’s default risk is high. By contrast, the 
option is more effective in firms with rapid growth or high levels of information 
asymmetry and therefore high monitoring costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Debt financing with the option of equity participation allows debtholders to 
participate in the value appreciation of the firms they finance on a non-obligatory 
basis. The participation may be full, as in the case of convertible debt where 
a debtholder may convert all debt into equity, or partial as in the case of 
straight debt financing with detachable warrants where a debtholder may buy 
additional equity from the firm by exercising the warrants. More recentiy, the 
development of mezzanine financing allows institutional holders of relatively 
high risk loans to buy stock from the firm or to share the profit when the 
venture is successful (Stacy, 1988).
The rationale of participation financing has already been discussed in a 
number of studies. Among other things, the participation clause acts as a 
sweetener to attract investors (Long & Sefcik, 1990). Participation financing 
may also serve as a means to reduce the agency costs of perk consumption 
(Bamea, Haugen, 8c Senbet, 1985). This paper focuses on the second aspect.
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In the absence of the participation option, the owner-manager of a leveraged 
firm may have an incentive to consume more perquisites which will result in 
increased agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The utilization of a partici­
pation financing contract, such as convertible bonds, allows outside investors to 
hold a put option which acts to ofifeet the negative impact of owner-manager 
perk consumption (Bamea, Haugan, 8c Senbet, 1985; Green, 1984).
The objective of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of participation 
financing in reducing small firm agency costs of perk consumption. In terms 
of their ownership structure, the sources of financing and the level of 
information asymmetry, the financial circumstances of small firms are very 
different from those of large firms; this often results in high levels of agency 
costs (Ang, 1991a,b; Bink, Ennew, 8c Reed, 1992; Dunstant, Dwyer, 8c Helmes, 
1992; Schnabel, 1992). It might serve the best interests of both small firm 
owners and outside investors to reduce these costs. A number of studies have 
already shown that some forms of financial contracting, among other things, 
can effectively reduce the agency costs of small firms. For instance, a 
well-designed stock option compensation scheme may reduce perk consump­
tion and induce more efficient management efforts (Chua 8c Woodward, 
1993; Mehran, 1992). On the other hand, the use of revolving asset-based 
lending contracts is another way of reducing information asymmetry and 
resolving agency problems (Constand, Osteryoung, & Nast, 1991). Moreover, 
efficient monitoring activities with costs shared partially by the owner-man- 
ager may induce him to lower perk consumption (Yazdipour 8c Song, 1991).
Although participation financing may be considered as an alternative 
method for dealing with agency problems, its effectiveness in financing small 
firms cannot be taken for granted. Some special features of small firms may 
have a decisive impact on the results of this particular form of financing. Due 
to the absence of a secondary market, the stock of small firms is much less 
liquid than that of large firms. Once investors decide to participate in the 
ownership of a small firm, it will be difficult to reverse this decision later on. 
Not only should investors value the participation decision in terms of value 
appreciation, but also in terms of the disadvantages such as the lack of 
liquidity which implies that they have to maintain their relation with the firm 
for the entire holding period which could end only at the time of initial public 
offer.
Secondly, due to rapid sales growth or a lack of external financing, small 
firms have less liquid funds and thus are riskier them large firms. The eventual 
pzirticipation in the ownership of small firms should be viewed as a contingent 
issue. Bamea, Haugan, 8c Senbet (1985) argue that the convertibility of debt 
is a put option, which can be exercised when the value of the firm falls below 
the price of participation. However, the debt in the analysis is in fact default-
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free. The same option on financial assets of a small firm should be more 
vulnerable and less likely to be exercised due to the high level of default risk.
Finally, most small firms are closely owned and controlled by entrepre­
neurs. The stock of these firms is not publicly traded and the firm is not 
required to reveal information to the public in exchange for financing. 
Consequendy, outside investors are often less informed about the firm. This 
makes participation less predictable since the participation decision depends 
on the information available to investors at the time when the decision is 
made. Although outside investors may monitor the activities of the inside 
owners, the costs of these activities may reduce the efficiency of the monitor 
activities unless at least one part of the cost can be passed to the owners 
(Yazdipour & Song, 1991).
The structure of this paper is designed to incorporate these particularities 
of small firms into the analysis. Section II discusses a valuation model of equity 
participation financing for a firm with risky debt. The impacts of the liquidity 
and possibility of bankruptcy on perk consumption is discussed. In Section
III, the opportunity for growth is added to the analysis. Growth may increase 
future cash flows, but it may also reduce the firm’s liquidity. For small firms 
which do not have access to public financing, high growth may mean high 
risk and high opportunity cost for perk consumption. Section IV extends the 
anal)«is to include asymmetrical information. The impacts of monitoring 
costs on the participation decision and entrepreneur perk consumption will 
also be examined. Finally, a discussion of the results obtained from the 
previous sections is presented in Section V.
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n . THE MODEL: nNANCING WITH OPTION OF PARTICIPATION
Under paiticipation financing, an outside investor provides a firm with debt 
financing which may be converted into equity. This could be regarded as a 
type of delayed equity financing with a put option which allows the investor 
to exercise the debt claim and remain outside of the firm. Although this 
option increases the value of the investment, the eventual benefit depends 
on the firm’s ability to repay the debt claim. In other words, the ability of the 
outside investor to exercise his right depends on the solvency of the firm. 
Typically, such an investment may result in three different outcomes: the 
investor participates in the ownership and becomes an owner of the firm; the 
investor receives the full debt repayment and ends the relationship with the 
firm; the firm defaults and the investor receives the cash flows generated by 
the operations of the firm.
The valuation model of participation financing presented in this section 
integrates the three possible results in the analysis whose objective is to 
examine the effects of the risk of default on the value of the option and more 
importantly, on the entrepreneur perk consumption. The following assump­
tions are used to develop the model:
1. The paper does not explicitiy discuss the investment decision. It 
assumes that the project cannot be divided, thm  the amount of 
financing required, B, is already given.
2. It is assumed that the contract allows the investor, if he wishes, to 
participate in the ownership of the firm, at the end of the contract 
period, by converting the debt into a proportion, a, of the firm’s equity 
at a stated price, C= rB + x where r  is one plus the interest rate and % 
a premium^
3. The eventual debt repayment depends on the firm’s cash flow at 
maturity, Y, which is assumed to follow a stochastic distribution func­
tion ^ y ) with a lower limit of k. Since the financing is unsecured the 
firm has the option of defaulting.
A rational investor would choose to participate in the firm if and only if 
F> C, By buying into the shares of the firm, the investor may hold a fraction, 
a, of the firm’s ownership and receive the same fraction of the firm’s fiiture 
cash flows. Note that the perks consumed by the entrepreneur, K, are usually 
included in the operating costs. Thus the liquidity available to repay the debt is 
the net cash flow Y -  Naturally, as the entrepreneur increases his perk 
consumption, there will be less cash left to repay the debt; hence the likelihood 
of defeult increases. Equation (1) below describes the conditions of defaiilt:
t) ^ Y - K  i iY < r B + K  (1) 
rB i iY > r B + K
Since the firm will default when the net cash flow is insufficient to cover 
the debt service obligations the condition of full debt servicing is Y —K >rB . 
Based on equation (1), the end-of-the-period value of wealth of the investor 
and that of the entrepreneur can be written as Fand Ebelow:^
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V= ( Y -  K )fiY ) rfr+ J rBf{Y) dY + a J (F -  b)f{Y)dY
F [Y \d Y + rB + a  \F {Y \d Y
(2 )
oo oo
£ =  K +  J (F -  b)f{Y )dY - a  J (F -  b)f{Y)dY
!  »  ^ (3) 
= ii:+jF[51dF-aJi?i(W
b c
where c= C+ ^Tand b= K +  rB. The first and second terms on the right hand 
side of equation (2 ) indicate the value of the ordinary debt to the investor 
while the last term in the same equation represents the value of the option. 
On the other hand, the value of the entrepreneur wealth consists of his perk 
consimiption and the value of the future cash flows, as shown in equation (3 ). 
Intuitively, the incentive of perk consumption is associated direcdy with the 
method of financing. In the case of straight equity financing, the cost of the 
entrepreneur perk consumption K  is shared between the entrepreneur and 
the outside investor. The net benefit to the entrepreneur from perk consump­
tion is the proportion of shares held by the investor. Thus for each dollar of 
K, the wealth transferred to the entrepreneur is a . This can also be seen from 
the optimal perk consumption of the entrepreneur:
| |= F [ i ] + a ( l - f M )
In the case of straight equity financing, both F[ b] and c] should be set 
equal to zero. Thus the marginal value of the entrepreneur’s perk consump­
tion is a. Under participation financing, the investor retains his option of 
withdrawing from the firm and this provides him with a protection. For a 
riskless firm or a relatively safe firm, the marginal benefit of perk consump­
tion to the entrepreneur is a ( l  -  this is obviously less valuable to the 
entrepreneur than in the case of equity financing. It would appear that the 
existence of the option allows the investor to capture some of the welfare 
losses resulting from the entrepreneur’s excessive perk consumption. How­
ever this is not always the case for a firm with risky debt. As the risk of default 
increases, the investor will be less able to exercise his option while the 
entrepreneur’s benefit for each dollar of perk consumption is the probability 
of default, f t  6]. The entrepreneur’s incentive for perk consumption in­
creases with the risk of default as long as the debt is not secured by other 
assets of the entrepreneur. With a sufficiently high level of risk, the entrepre­
neur’s perk consumption will not fall even if a participation clause is included 
in the financing contract.
Although high risk of default encourages the owner-manager to increase 
perk consumption, it is still possible to find an incentive-compatible contract
Participation Financing and Perk Consumption 219
for a risky firm by choosing the cost of financing, r, given the proportion of 
shares held by the outside investors. From equations (3) and (4), it is possible 
to find the condition which will insure that does not increase. Mathemati­
cally, the participation financing is effective only when F [b \ < qlF [ c] . To 
ensure that this model of financing is efficient in solving agency problem, the 
marginal value of the perk consumption to the entrepreneur under the 
contract mechanism should be non-positive such as:
= ii’[^>*]+a(l-i5'[<f]) = 0 (5)
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dK
In exchange for lower perk consumption, the investor reduces the interest 
rate charged on the debt in order to reduce F[b]; this consequendy would 
tend to reduce incentives to transfer the cost of perks in the case of default 
at a given level of the shares held by outside investors after the conversion.^
in. EQUITY PARTICIPATION IN THE GROW ra FIRM
As indicated in the previous section, the possibility of default dilutes the value 
of the participation option and encourages entrepreneurs to consume more 
perks. However, this result was obtained on the basis of an implicit assumption 
that the entrepreneur does not have to consider any costs or penalties 
associated with his perk consumption. The reality of perk consumption may be 
more complex; the decision of perk consumption requires a carefol calculation 
of the cost-benefit trade off. The particular trade off analyzed in this section is 
between the current perk consumption and the future consumption based on 
the opportunity for growth. Intuitively, the future perk consumption is closely 
linked to the growth of the firm. When the firm is bankrupt, the entrepreneur 
loses not only his capital but also future perk consumption. TTie high opportunity 
cost associated with the firm’s growth potential should induce the entrepreneur 
to reduce the current perk consumption.
High growth rate may also increase the risk of the firm. While publicly- 
traded firms may use external sources to finance growth, small and privately- 
held firms have to rely on their own funds. Frequently, small firms invest a 
lai^e part, if not all, of the internally generated funds into projects which are 
not expected to generate significant new cash flows until some time in the 
future. Although investment in such projects allows small firms to grow, it 
reduces the liquidity. The firm becomes more vulnerable and consequendy 
the risk of default on its current debt may rise.
Suppose that a firm continues to reinvest a fixed amount, 6 , from its czish 
flow, in new investment projects. The net cash flow at the debt maturity is, T
= 7 - 8 .  Consequently, the total value of the firm at that time is equal to its 
net cash flow plus the residual value resulting from the growth opportunities, 
Q= where 9  is a parameter to measure the value of the future cash flows 
generated from the investment. Under these assumptions, the value of the 
entrepreneur’s wealth can be written as:
00 00
£ =  J ( r  -  6 + Q )fiX )d Y  -  a  J ( r  -  Q )j{Y )dY  + K  (6 )
b c
and the entrepreneur’s optimal perk consumption can be written as
—  = + a (l -  F[c*]) -  Q(1 -  a ) f  (7)
where b* = 6 + 8  and c* = c + 8 . Note that F[b*] = + 8 ], is the probability of 
default based on the cash flow net of perk consumption and investment?. It 
is interesting to note that the usefulness of the participation option in 
reducing the perk consumption depends on the balance of the two opposing 
effects which result from high grov^ . Each time the investment in a growth 
project increases, it absorbs cash flow which could otherwise be used to repay 
debt. The higher default risk which results from cash flow shortfall allows the 
entrepreneur to benefit from a more valuable wealth transfer. However, this 
also makes current perk consumption more costiy since the total expected 
loss is equal to Q x For each dollar of perks consumed currently, the 
entrepreneur loses Qf[b*] w here/[i^] is the marginal probability of default 
derived from additional perk consumption. Thus the high growth potential 
may serve as a self-imposed penalty on current consumption. The last term 
of equation (7) shows this effect. Since depends on both the size of 
investment and the expected return on the investment projects, the entre­
preneur whose firm has a more profitable project will be more cautious in 
choosing his perk consumption in order to avoid losing Q. This is the result 
which cannot be obtained with straight equity financing since in that case the 
value of /should be equal to zero thus the marginal benefit of perk consump­
tion will not be affected by the opportunity for growth.
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IV. EQUITY PARTICIPATION UNDER ASYMMETRICAL
INFORMATION
One issue which often arises in dealing with the agency problems such as perk 
consumption is that the subject is not always directly observable. This is 
particularly true in case of small firms where information is somewhat difficult
to obtain. Small firms are usually private and few sources of information on 
them are available to the public. Even when information is produced in order 
to obtain financing from outside investors, it is often incomplete. Thus the 
owner-manager may possess inside information permitting him to benefit 
when dealing with outside investors.
An investor may attempt to design a particular participation financing 
contract to eliminate incentives to excessive perk consumption by the entre­
preneur. But as indicated previously in equation (5), this can be done only 
in the context of perfect information where the investor knows the entrepre­
neur’s exact objective function. When the objective function is unknown, the 
investor cannot predict the perk consumption, thus the contracting process 
should follow a different framework as below:
- ,  T/ AMax V  -:r^= 0.
r, s.t.
The entrepreneur maximizes the value of his wealth while the investor is 
looking for the optimal solution based on the partial information available 
to him. The decision variable is the interest rate, r. Given asymmetrical 
information on the part of the entrepreneur, the investor is unable to design 
an incentive compatible contract; thus the entrepreneur can increase his perk 
consumption without worrying about the reaction from outside investors.
Although some information is not available to the outside investor, it 
could be obtained at a cost. This implies that the investor spend time and 
money to monitor the activities of the entrepreneur in a timely fashion. The 
monitoring activities may allow the investor to identify the entrepreneur 
incentives and prevent the expropriation of the value of the firm by the latter. 
The monitoring, however, is costly, especially for the investors who hold the 
portfolios which include large number of small firms®. The monitoring 
activities and their cost may exert an important impact on both inside owner 
and outside investors, especially because the monitoring cost may act as a 
barrier to the participation: the investor may not exercise his participation 
option if the potential gain is not sufficient to cover the monitoring costs. 
Past experience concerning the convertible debt of large firms suggests that 
in a significant number of cases, the debt was not converted even diough the 
value of the underlying assets was significandy higher than the exercise price. 
This implies the existence of an implicit exercise premium set by investors 
(Asquith &: Mullins, 1991).
Suppose that monitoring activities can reduce current perk consumption 
by a particular percentage, s, which is a positive function of the monitoring 
cost, g. Knowing the value of g, the outside investors increases the threshold
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of participation such that d = c + g. With these modifications, the entrepre­
neur’s objective function becomes
oo oo
E = i l - s ) K + j { Y * - b + Q ) J i r ) d r - a j { r - b - g + Q ) f i Y * ) d r .  (9)
b <f
The solvency of the firm at maturity is determined by the liquidity of the 
firm y  while the investor’s participation is based not only on the exercise 
price but also on the cost of surveillance. If the entrepreneur is assumed to 
select his current perk consumption, then the optimal value of K will be based 
on the following condition:
—  = (1 -  5) + + (1 -  a) (1 -  F[t']) - d l -  oc)/= 0. (10)
Compared to equation (7), the optimal iiTfrom equation (10) is expected 
to be lower because of the lower marginal value of perk consumption. The 
existence of monitoring costs tends to make the investor more cautious when 
deciding to participate and more inclined to claim debt repayment. To see 
the impact of the monitoring cost, we take the partial derivative of the 
equation (10) with respect to g.
g = - . . - ( l - a ) / < 0 .  (11)
Interestingly, the cost of monitoring reduces the possibility of the partici­
pation and therefore the incentive of entrepreneur perk consumption. The 
explanation of this result is fairly straightforward: the high costs of monitoring 
reduces the likelihood of equity participation of outside investors hence the 
effect of wealth transfer is weaker. In firms with high levels of monitoring cost 
which results from a high degree of information asymmetry, the existence of 
the option allows outside investors, as potential shareholders, to exercise 
pressure on the entrepreneur to reduce perk consumption. If the entrepre­
neur wishes to maintain the outside financing, he has no choice but to release 
more information to the public. This may help to reduce monitoring costs 
and to increase the likelihood of investors participation. Either way, the 
investors will benefit.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The entrepreneur-owner of a small firm will benefit from the excessive perk 
consumption as long as outside investors hold shares in the firm. To finance
projects, small firms often use financial instruments which include an equity 
participation option. When the investors have the option to choose between 
claiming debt repayment and buying shares in the firm, the participation is 
contingent. Although the usefulness of this particular form of financing in 
reducing the owner-manager’s perquisite consumption in large firms is 
understandable, its effectiveness in small firms is less obvious.
Outside investors can choose to hold debt claim and not to participate in 
the firm as shareholders and not to share the cost of perks, but they still have 
to bear at least part of the cost if the firm defaults on the debt at maturity. As 
long as somebody else will pay part of the bill the entrepreneur is encouraged 
to consume more perks. Thus participation financing is effective in dealing 
with the issue of perk consumption only when the default risk of the firm is 
low.
In general, the value of the firm increases with its growth rate. However, 
this is true only for firms which finance growth with external funds. Small 
firms usually have to rely on internal sources of financing to realize growth. 
The entrepreneur’s future revenue and perk consumption are linked direcdy 
to the firm’s growth potential. Rapid growth reduces the firm’s liquidity and 
increases the risk of default. Thus the opportunity cost of perk consumption 
to the entrepreneur becomes more expensive. Growth may act as a self-imposed 
penalty which forces the entrepreneur to reduce perk consumption. With 
straight equity financing the entrepreneur may be less concerned with the 
risk of default. The use of the participation financing introduces the possibil­
ity of default and increases the opportunity cost of entrepreneur perk con­
sumption thus giving the outside investor some measure of protection.
Unless they can find the means to protect themselves against unpredicted 
events, investors will be less likely to participate in the firm when there is no 
sufficient information. Constant monitoring over the inside-owner’s activities 
by outside investors may offer some protections from being manipulated and 
expropriated. But the cost of such activity reduces the likelihood of investor 
participation in the firm. In this context, the entrepreneur has no choice but 
to reduce the consumption of perquisites or to release more information on 
his ex-post behavior in order to calm the investors’ fears. Other things being 
equal, financing with an option of participation should have stronger effects 
on entrepreneur perk consumption in firms with high degrees of information 
asymmetry. Moreover, the choice of this particular method of financing may 
also play a role in information signalling. For the entrepreneur who is not 
well known to investors, the use of participation financing may allow him to 
convince the investors and reduce the cost of financing.
The results of this paper may provide useful suggestions on the future 
direction of empirical studies. The potential future researches could concen-
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txate on the three hypotheses raised in this paper. It would be interesting to 
test the impacts of three exogenous variables on the use of participation 
financing as a solution to the agency problem: probability of default, growth 
rate of sales revenue and the proportion of the stocks controlled by inside- 
owner. Such research may include firms of different sizes in an attempt to 
identify the existence, if any, of small firm effects. The timing of participation 
is also an important factor determining the effectiveness of participation. This 
article has analyzed the case of a European option where the investors can 
only choose at debt maturity. A further theoretical study may examine the 
more robust case of the American option and see dynamic relation between 
the perk consumption and the decision of participation.
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NOTES
1. This implies that the proportion o f equity held by the debtholder after participation is 
exogenously given, based on the value o f debt and that o f the equity at the time of 
contract negotiation.
2. Obviously, the perk consumed by the entrepreneur should be always less than the 
minimum cash flow k, at the lower limit o f the distribution.
3. Equation (2) presented in the text is obtained from the results developed below:
b CO oo
y= j ( F -  K)f(Y)dY+ J rBf(Y)dY+  a |  ( 7 -  b)f{Y)dY 
k  b  b
h  b  oo oo
= r ^ f ( Y ) d Y + j r B f ( Y ) d Y + j r B f ( Y ) d Y + a j ( Y -  b)f(Y)
k k b c
b
= - \ { b -  Y)f{Y)dY+ rB+ a  J (F -  b ) f m Y
= - \F \ ,Y \d Y + r B  + a.\F[Y\dY.
k  C
Equation (3) is obtained in a similar way.
4. The percentage of shares held by an outside investor has a direct impact on the 
effectiveness of participation financing. Usually, the entrepreneur will benefit more 
when a larger proportion of the shares is held by outside investors who cannot 
participate in perk consumption but will share the costs. However, the existence o f the 
option reduces the benefit by a proportion of (xF[c] . It is easy to see that the impact of 
the option increases with the proportion o f outside equity participation.
5. The ability of repaying debt is based on the cash available. The firm cannot refinance 
its debt at maturity. This, however, is a very restrictive condition. In reality, the firm 
might be able to obtain financing given that its future growth is promising.
6. In their study, MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian (1988) found that many institutional 
investors, mainly venture capitalists, are usually involved in the financial aspects of the 
firms which they invested. Their involvement in the other aspects o f the firms are, 
however, limited.
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